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1979 and all that: a 40-year reassessment 
of Margaret Thatcher’s legacy on her 
own terms
Kevin Albertson  and Paul Stepney*
Economics are the method: The object is to change the soul (Thatcher, 1981)
There is a growing disaffection with mainstream politics in the world’s liberal democra-
cies. In particular, the UK has become an increasingly divided nation; as evidenced by, 
for example, increasing inequality, an emphasis on individualism, the so-called North/
South divide and the polarised debate about the UK’s leaving the European Union. Many 
leading UK politicians claim their inheritance of the “Thatcher legacy” to legitimate their 
proposed policies, yet it is not clear what is that legacy. Thatcher’s policies, instituted in the 
1980s and broadly pursued by subsequent governments, changed the economic and social 
outlook of the UK. Criticism of her record is taken to indicate one is a left-wing ideologue. 
Our contribution in the following is that we judge Thatcher’s policies by no standards other 
than her own. Utilising a holistic approach, we consider whether neo-liberal policies facili-
tated or undermined the UK’s achieving Thatcher’s stated moral outcomes: the growth of 
democratic capitalism and the strengthening of the moral economy. We demonstrate, in 
contrast to contemporary narratives of her “saving the country”, the neo-liberal economic 
experiment has failed to deliver, even on Thatcher’s own terms. This analysis has contem-
porary domestic and global implications as generally Thatcherite policies continue to be 
applied in the UK and in other nations around the world.
Key words: Thatcher, Neo-liberalism, Economic history, UK politics, Free-markets
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1. Introduction
There is no such thing as society. There is [a] living tapestry of men and women and people and the 
beauty of that tapestry and the quality of our lives will depend upon how much each of us is prepared to 
take responsibility for ourselves and each of us prepared to turn round and help by our own efforts those 
who are unfortunate. (Thatcher, 1987)
The legitimacy of democratic government depends, according to Abraham Lincoln 
(1854), on its ability to do for a community that which they would have done but 
cannot do for themselves as individuals. If this is so, it seems recent UK governments 
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have not been delivering on voters’ aspirations. Every decade-cohort of young people 
born in the UK since the 1960s has been less enamoured with the democratic process 
than their elders (Foa and Mounk, 2017). These are the young people who became 
eligible to vote during the governments of Margaret Thatcher and her successors. We 
examine below the particular impact of her policies on this generation.
Under Thatcher, leader of the Conservative Party from 1975 to 1990, and Prime Minister 
from 4 May 1979 to 22 November 1990, data indicate that the economic and social pro-
spects of the typical British household underwent a sea-change. Saluted as a class-warrior 
(The Herald, 2013; The Telegraph, 2013), whether one saw her policies and her successor’s, 
John Major (Prime Minister from November 1990 to May 1997) as necessary and/or suc-
cessful depends upon one’s point of view (Financial Times, 2013), or so it is said.
She has been voted both the greatest (YouGov, 2013) and the worst recent UK Prime 
Minister (The Guardian, 2016). During her first term, many predicted the crisis her pol-
icies would produce (Courts et al., 1981) yet, by the time of her resignation, the majority 
(52%) of the British people were of the opinion that her government had been good for 
the country (IpsosMORI, 2013), even though she was personally disliked by the ma-
jority (60%) (IpsosMORI, 2013). At the least, perhaps, most would agree with one-time 
Liberal Democrat leader Paddy Ashdown (quoted in The Guardian, 2016), ‘she laid out 
her stall and she achieved it’. However, it is precisely here where the record is weak.
In the following, we consider the efficacy of these policies from the point of view of 
Thatcher’s and her government’s stated aspirations. It is often assumed that Thatcher’s goals 
were purely economic, the re-establishing of the principles of free-market fundamentalism 
(neo-liberalism as she—and many others—called it, Thatcher, 2003, p. 337). However, that 
is to underestimate the scale of her ambition. Thatcher (1981) sought to ‘change the soul’ of 
the British people: and believed ‘Economics is the method’ by which this might be achieved.
Although we necessarily focus primarily on her economic policies (assessing the extent 
to which they delivered, or failed to deliver, the results for which she had hoped) following 
Thatcher, these are only the method. We cannot judge her legacy in purely economic terms 
(Stepney, 2014) but rather by whether she wove or unravelled the ‘living tapestry’ of the UK.
In Section 2, we consider the impact of neo-liberal policies on economic growth and 
incomes growth. In Section 3, we consider the changing employment and welfare pro-
spects of the British people. In Sections 4 and 5, we assess Thatcher’s success in pro-
moting home ownership and shares ownership, respectively. In Section 6, we consider 
her success in promoting the moral society she sought. In Section 7, we consider ex-
planations for her supposed popularity. Conclusions are drawn in Section 8.
2. Economic growth
everyone in the nation has benefited from increased prosperity – everyone. (Thatcher, 1988)
In the first instance, we consider the impact of Thatcher’s policies on the UK’s eco-
nomic growth in three aspects: national income, household income and poverty. We 
will consider, in each case, the inheritance of the 1980s and whether it is reasonable to 
suppose the UK economy was revitalised by the policies of the 1980s.
2.1 National income
If it is the case that the adoption of free-market ideology improved the UK’s economic pro-
spects (Thatcher, 2003), it is reasonable to suppose the rate of economic growth was greater 
after this adoption than before. However, the data (Table 1, Figure 1) undermine this 
supposition.
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Clearly, the sea-change which occurred in UK economic prospects in the 1980s was 
not a change for the better; per capita real income growth slowed markedly post-1979. 
Since 1979, each government has underperformed its predecessor in this regard; how-
ever, these governments have also adopted broadly free-market policies (Dorling, 2010; 
Stepney, 2014), including increased labour market flexibility, free-market globalisation, 
increasing reliance on debt, exploitation of fossil fuels and privatisation of public assets.
This analysis supports that of Cribb et al. (2016) who consider, among other meas-
ures, net equivalised1 household income (after housing costs) by birth cohorts. They 
show incomes have stagnated across much of the economy since the 1980s. In their 
early 30s, for example, the average household comprised of those born in the 1980s is 
earning less than their elder siblings (born in the 1970s) did when they were in their 
30s. Similarly, the 1970s generation, on average, are earning less than the median 
households of those born in the 1960s, 1950s or even 1940s, despite these latter are 
generally retired (Cribb et al., 2016).
Table 1.  Annualised increase in real GDP per capita of post-war governmentsa
Government Years Annualised growth rate
Conservative 1951–64 2.82%
Labour 1964–70 2.22%
Conservative 1970–74 2.59%
Labour 1974–79 2.31%
Conservative 1979–97 2.09%
New Labour 1997–2010 1.37%
Coalition (Cons./Lib.Dem) 2010–15 1.32%
Conservative 2015– 1.13%
aThe first post-war Labour term is not included as the nation had not yet fully recovered from the war 
years—rationing, for example, only ended in 1954. Only the first two years of the government elected in 
2015 is considered for reasons of lack of data.
Fig. 1. Real GDP per capita (left-hand scale) and annualised growth rates.
Source: Thomas and Williamson (2018); and authors’ calculations. 
1 Income is equivalised, that is to say, adjusted, to take account of differing household composition.
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2.2 Household income
Since the 1980s, there is evidence that each generation is doing less well financially than 
the one preceding. However, within this, there were significant differences between the 
impact on rich and poor (Dorling, 2015). During the 1979–97 Conservative govern-
ments, those households with greater disposable income benefited from a greater rate 
of incomes growth (Table 2). Only households in the top one-third of the distribution 
saw incomes growing at least as rapidly as GDP per capita. The least well-off house-
holds (those in the lowest income decile) saw their incomes decline on average under 
Thatcher (see also Hills, 1998, figure 9). What growth they did experience during the 
1979–97 Conservative government occurred under Major (1990–97).
Despite this reduction in income, the economically vulnerable were able to increase 
their expenditure during the Thatcher years (Goodman and Webb, 1995) through 
borrowing. Household debt increased from 37% of GDP in 1979 to 73% by 1990 
(Cecchetti et al., 2011).
2.3 Poverty
Given that the better-off households experienced the greatest growth in incomes, and 
the least well-off households experienced the lowest growth of incomes, inequality 
increased significantly during the 1980s. Such an increase might be justified (Rawls, 
1971) if the increasing inequality was to the benefit of the most economically vulner-
able. Thatcher (1988, 1996) argued this was the case; the data undermine this con-
tention. A recent analysis published by the Institute of Fiscal Studies (Belfield et al., 
2016) indicates that this increase in inequality still impacts families today: Much of the 
relative poverty currently experienced in the UK dates from the 1980s. In particular, 
the so-called ‘Breadline Poor’, those with insufficient resources to participate in the 
norms of society (see Dorling et al., 2007 and references therein) have seen their pro-
spects decay since 1980.
2.4 Conclusion: income growth
Neo-liberal policies failed to boost the UK rate of growth across the board. Although 
the incomes of the already affluent grew more rapidly than average national income, 
Thatcher’s hoped-for trickle-down of prosperity did not occur. Insofar, as anything did 
trickle down, it was not prosperity, but debt. It is also worth noting, the governments of 
Thatcher and her successors have overseen an increase in health inequalities alongside 
an increase in income inequalities. This is despite the Thatcher government’s adop-
tion of the World Health Organization’s Global Strategy for reducing such inequalities 
(Shaw et al., 2005; Dorling, 2018).
3. The labour market
We Conservatives hate unemployment. … We deplore the waste of national resources, and the deep affront 
to peoples’ dignity from being out of work through no fault of their own. (Thatcher, 1975)
Thatcher was not alone in implying (though not stating) that her government would 
facilitate a reduction in unemployment: It is difficult to find a politician who is in 
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favour of unemployment, at least notionally. It is also difficult to find a politician whose 
policies have reduced unemployment substantially.
3.1 Unemployment
Notwithstanding advertising firm Saatchi and Saatchi’s assertion ‘Labour Isn’t 
Working’ (Delaney, 2015) in the run-up to the 1979 election, the lowest unemploy-
ment rate recorded during the 1980s was when Thatcher came to office in May 1979: 
4.2% (ONS, 2018). In April 1984, the unemployment rate reached its 1980 peak of 
more than double this: 9.5%. By 1990, when Thatcher resigned, headline unemploy-
ment was 6.1%; still around three-quarters of a million people greater than in 1979 
(ONS, 2018).
3.2 Employment
Perhaps the more telling figure, however, is employment (Figure 2). Over the last four 
decades, the employment rate in the UK of men aged 16–64 and women aged 16–59 
has been reasonably stable, fluctuating from 68% (April/May 1983) to 77% (March 
2018). Employment was 74% in both May 1979 and in November 1990.
The 1970s are frequently portrayed (e.g. Mirza-Davies, 2015) as a time of full em-
ployment. If one considers male employment (92% in February 1971), this seems to 
be borne out. The employment rate for women was 56% in February 1971; however, 
it was considered both more acceptable and more affordable for one or other of a mar-
ried or cohabiting couple to work as home-maker in the 1970s. Such adults are not in 
the (paid) labour force and do not count for the purposes of recorded unemployment. 
Thus, in 1971, the unemployment rates for men and women were very similar at 3% 
for men and 5% for women.
The relative stability of employment rates over the last four decades rather under-
mines claims there are plenty of good jobs available if the unemployed would only 
look. It seems reasonable to suppose an individual who does ‘get on yer bike’ (Tebbit, 
1981) will enhance their prospects of getting a job relative to another unemployed person; 
however, they will not create a job. The evidence indicates that employment levels 
will remain approximately constant, even if the composition of the employed becomes 
more skewed towards cyclists.
Fig. 2. Employment rates in the UK (men 16–64, women 16–59).
Source: ONS (2018).
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3.3 Modernisation of the welfare state
A related political mythos is that reducing social security will create employment (c.f. 
Osborne, 2014) by making work relatively more attractive. This again assumes there 
are sufficient jobs available. However, relative to average consumption expenditure 
in the UK, unemployment benefit for a single person has approximately halved since 
the 1980s (Atkinson, 2015), yet employment has been stable. A VECM(2) (Johansen, 
1988, 1991) analysis of the impact of the level of unemployment benefits on the head-
line unemployment rate indicates that there is no significant long-run effect—there 
is no evidence that higher benefits cause higher unemployment. There is, however, 
evidence of a relationship in the other direction—higher unemployment is related to 
lower benefits. This supports the proposition that politicians, wrongly diagnosing the 
impact of welfare, are inclined to reduce social security when it is most needed.
Indeed, ‘the development of the conditional and affordable welfare state’ (Stepney, 
2018a, p. 46) was a policy goal of Thatcher’s. This initiative replaced governments’ 
commitment to universal social security with targeted support for the working poor, 
and policies based on labour market activation (workfare) protection for the deserving 
poor and those assessed as vulnerable and high risk. These policies are associated with 
an increasingly polarised and divided society (Stepney, 2018a), but not with an in-
crease in employment.
3.4 The ‘missing’
At the time of writing, employment in the UK remains at circa 75%. Nevertheless, 
the current headline unemployment rate is not, as we might suppose, circa 25%, but a 
more modest 4%. The seeming paradox arises because the proportion of working-age 
people entering the labour force (becoming economically active) has been roughly 
matched by the proportion leaving the labour force. In general, those of working age 
who leave the labour force, or defer joining, have two major destinations, higher (or 
further) education and disabilities benefits (soon to be transferred to universal credit).
In 1970–71, there were 621,000 students in UK Higher Education (HE) (of which 
560,000 were undergraduates) (ONS, 2010), while in 2013–14, there were 2,299,355 
(Universities UK, 2015). Students, even if they work full- or part-time, are not con-
sidered members of the labour force. This increase in enrolment for higher education 
has therefore reduced the size of the labour force by one-and-two-third millions.
Alongside of this, the number of people on invalidity benefits (specifically Working 
Age IB/SDA excluding IBST(L)) more than doubled from 1979 to 1990 (DWP Online 
a, Online b). At the time of writing, there are approximately two and a half million 
members of the workforce who are not counted as unemployed while receiving such 
benefits (Figure 3).
3.5 Conclusion: employment
During Thatcher’s time in office, and since, much lack of employment did not count 
towards headline unemployment because of the increase in HE enrolment and dis-
ability statistics (c.f. Beatty and Fothergill, 1999; Beatty et  al., 2012). Even so, the 
data do not support the hypothesis that Thatcher’s policies were successful in reducing 
unemployment or increasing employment. Despite welfare reform, it was dependency, 
not employment, that increased during the 1980s.
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4. Housing
To most people ownership means first and foremost a home of their own. (Conservative Party, 1979)
A major plank of Thatcher’s social policy was to facilitate home ownership (Conservative 
Party, 1979). This accords with her goal of transforming the UK into a ‘property-owning 
democracy’ (Thatcher, 1993, p. 698), in which a high proportion of citizens owns a stake 
in the nation.
4.1 Right to Buy
One of the tools utilised by local government to address the lack of affordable 
housing in the mid-twentieth century was to build and rent so-called council houses 
of an appropriate quality and quantity. Council tenants’ ‘Right to Buy’ was fore-
most amongst Thatcher’s policies for increasing home-ownership (Conservative 
Party, 1979). Introduced in the Housing Act 1980 (HM Government, 1980), 
and extended in The Housing and Building Control Act 1984, Housing Act 1985 
and Housing and Planning Act 1986, the policy gave tenants the right to buy the 
council house in which they resided at discounts of up to 75% below market prices 
(House of Commons, 1999).
Not all public housing was sold, of course; not all tenants could afford to buy, and 
not all council houses were desirable properties to own. In practice, the better public 
properties were sold to the more affluent tenants (House of Commons, 1999). Those 
fortunate enough to exercise their Right to Buy benefited from the gift of public assets 
worth over £200 billion (2010–12 values) through the discounts offered (Atkinson, 
2015, p. 162). Thatcher thus generated a substantial amount of goodwill towards her 
government amongst some members of the electorate, even amongst former oppos-
ition supporters (Stepney, 2014).
Right to Buy was also good for central government financially, at least in the short term. 
The bulk of public proceeds went to national, rather than local, government (Disney and 
Luo, 2017). These proceeds were significant: by 1999, Right to Buy had raised more 
money than any other privatisation of public assets (House of Commons, 1999); by 2003, 
Fig. 3. The number of people on Disability Benefits in the UK.
Source: DWP (Online a, Online b).
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the central government had benefited to the tune of £36.8 billion (Atkinson, 2015). The 
local government saw little, if any, financial benefit from the policy. Furthermore, it re-
tained the statutory duty to accommodate the homeless despite its much-reduced stock 
of housing. This proved problematic as the number of applicants for council housing 
more than doubled during the 1980s (Disney and Luo, 2017).
Unsurprisingly, home building by local authorities collapsed after Right to Buy; 
however, the private sector did not make up the shortfall (Figure 4). Compared to 
1979–80, the UK rate of home completions declined 13% by 1990, 29% by 1997 
and 51% by 2013/14. Of the housing which was built, an increasing proportion be-
came owned by foreign interests (Dorling, 2015; Valentine, 2015; Atkinson et al., 2016; 
Fernandez et al., 2016).
The data indicate (Figure 5) that part of the increased prosperity the British enjoyed 
in the immediate post-war years was invested in property prior to Right to Buy. Insofar, 
as Right to Buy contributed to the continuation of this trend, it was a one-off effect 
as it facilitated privatisation of existing housing, but did not promote the building of 
additional housing. If anything, by discouraging councils from building, Right to Buy 
may have decreased the supply of homes.
Fig. 4. Permanent dwellings completed, by tenure per 1,000 of the UK population. Financial years 
1979/80 to 2013/14
Source: ONS (2015a); Thomas and Williamson (2018); and authors’ calculations.
Fig. 5. GB housing stock (including vacant), by tenure per 1,000 of the GB population.
Source: HM Government (2018); Thomas and Williamson (2018); NISRA (2017); and  
authors’ calculations.
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Forced through globalisation to compete in the housing market with the inter-
national super-rich while UK housebuilding per capita declined, the average Briton 
has found housing less affordable since the 1980s (Dorling, 2015). The rate of owner 
occupation (including vacant properties) is currently declining. The vacancy rate is 
itself an issue: In England alone, it is estimated that over 600,000 potential homes 
were empty in October 2015; more than 200,000 of these for a period in excess of six 
months (Wilson et al., 2018).
Neither is renting more affordable; in the three decades from 1987, rents increased 
at a greater rate than median household incomes less direct taxes (ONS Online e). 
Over the same period, the real housing benefit (rent subsidy) required by median 
households more than doubled. In 2017 alone, total housing benefit paid was £22 bil-
lion (DWP Online c).
Home ownership, other than through inheritance, amongst younger generations is be-
coming ever more rare. According to the Institute for Fiscal Studies (Cribb et al., 2016), the 
UK’s millennial generation, born in the 1980s, has only about two-thirds as much chance of 
owning their own home by age 30 as those born in the 1950s or 1940s. Increasingly unable 
even to afford rent, many young people are simply living with their parents (ONS, 2016).2
4.2 Conclusion: housing
Right to Buy generated funds and goodwill for central government, and boosted home 
ownership amongst the more affluent former council house tenants in the short run. 
However, there is no evidence Thatcher’s policies made it easier for the typical Briton 
to buy (or rent) a home in the longer term. The amount paid in housing benefit has 
increased at more than twice the rate of inflation since 1987, implying the taxpayer is 
increasingly subsidising, not affordable home ownership, but high rental costs.
5. Privatisation
Why have we allowed people to buy shares in nationalised industries? Only to improve efficiency? No. To 
spread the nation’s wealth among as many people as possible. (Thatcher, 1986)
Although the Conservative Party (1979) manifesto barely mentions privatisation, 
undertaking only to ‘offer to sell back to private ownership the recently national-
ised aerospace and shipbuilding … [and] … to sell shares in the National Freight 
Corporation’ (Conservative Party, 1979), privatisation came to define the economic 
policies of the 1980s (Financial Times, 2011).
There were three main motivations for privatisation (Rhodes et al., 2014). A primary 
motivation was the need of the government of the day for ready money to boost the 
economy in a time of recession, while at the same time keeping a lid on public sector 
debt and taxes. However, as the programme developed, the underlying theory was also 
developed. Privatisation was promoted to the UK public also as a means of making the 
UK more efficient and as a means of developing democratic capitalism, under which 
(some) citizens would have a capitalist stake in the nation. Privatisation was also, of 
course, pursued for purely ideological reasons; many held to the belief that the public 
sector simply ought not to own industry, irrespective of its relative efficiency.
2 This rather makes us wonder how much of the increase in household income at the bottom end of the 
distribution may have resulted from having an increased number of wage earners in each household as some 
young people cannot afford to move out.
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5.1 Motivations and evidence
5.1.1 Raising funds.
According to HM Treasury (1997), the UK government realised in excess of US$80 
billion from public flotations between 1980 and 1996. This was far in excess of the 
more measured approaches of other OECD nations. In this period, the UK accounted 
for 40% of the total global proceeds of privatisation (HM Treasury, 1997). Funds 
raised, along with the billions raised from North Sea oil and gas revenues and further 
billions raised from Right to Buy gave central government the means to spend its way 
out of the recession of the early 1980s while maintaining the narrative of cutting taxes 
and reducing borrowing.
As a windfall means of gaining access to short-term financial resources, the policy was 
a limited success; limited in the sense that more money could have been raised. The UK’s 
(formerly) public productive assets were generally offered at a substantial discount on 
market prices (Laurin et al., 2004). The fact that the fortunate few who bought shares 
could cash them in at a substantial premium may have generated a lot of goodwill towards 
the government; although it has been argued that most of those benefiting from the wind-
fall gains of privatisation were Conservative voters already (Stevens, 2004).
5.1.2 Making business more efficient.
A second supposed objective of privatisation was to promote economic efficiency in the 
UK. This is no straightforward objective. We must bear in mind that what is efficient 
for an individual business is not necessarily efficient for the economy as a whole. It was 
for this reason many of the free-market economists of the 1930s and 1940s supported 
nationalisation of key utilities and transport. They considered only democratic account-
ability—that is, public ownership—will prevent natural monopolies from exploiting the 
public (c.f. Simons, 1934; Rüstow, the original neo-liberal, as cited by Hartwich, 2009). 
Recent history indicates that these concerns had some merit. Such is the strength of the 
current narrative of overcharging by privatised utilities sectors and railways, the cold-war 
political-economic policy of a price cap has recently been resurrected by the UK govern-
ment (May, 2017). Notwithstanding, overall, there is scant evidence of efficiency gains 
(Hart, 1996; Hall, 2014) or of benefit to the customer arising from privatisation (Parker 
and Martin, 1995; Letza et al., 2004; High Pay Centre, 2014).
Thatcher (1992) had also supposed that privatisation would increase investment in 
British business. In this, she would likewise be disappointed. There is no evidence that 
UK business invested more as a result of this innovation. From the 1980s to the 1990s, 
the UK’s rate of gross investment by business was one of the lowest in the OECD 
(Pelgrin et al., 2002). Privatisation generally has not delivered, therefore, in improving 
efficiency or promoting business investment.
5.1.3 Spreading share ownership.
The overriding goal of privatisation, according to Thatcher at least, was to promote 
a ‘capital owning democracy’ (Thatcher, cited in Yergin et al., 1998; c.f. Howe et al., 
1977). However, there are few indications that privatisation has led to this result—
rather the opposite; UK quoted shares have been accumulated by foreign interests, 
including, rather ironically given Thatcher’s opinion of the relative efficiency of state 
ownership, foreign governments (Figure 6).
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Although the proportion of shares held in an individual capacity by UK citizens was 
declining before the Thatcher years, approximately halving from 1963 to 1981, clearly 
the Thatcher reforms did little to address this decline. Conversely, the proportion of 
UK quoted shares in foreign hands approximately quadrupled during the Thatcher 
years, and has quadrupled again since (ONS, 2015b, 2017a).
5.2 Marketisation
Alongside of outright privatisation, recent UK governments have also pursued a policy 
of marketisation. This initiative, based on the ideological assumption of the relative 
efficiency of the private to the public sector, involved introducing quasi-market mech-
anisms into public services through a separation of the purchaser and provider func-
tions of state agencies. This facilitated a plethora of private organisations entering the 
market to sub-contract to government particularly in health, social care and housing 
(Buchanan et al., 2009). The introduction of quasi-markets in the NHS for example has 
led to a confusing array of independent and private sector organisations available to 
commissioning groups to deliver health care services often with no clear lines of ac-
countability (Klein, 2013). Similarly, welfare clients have found it difficult to operate 
as active and effective consumers in the new care markets, as these favour the more 
articulate and affluent service users (Clarke, 2004).
Some would argue the privatisation strategy itself was undemocratic, given the hos-
tility of the British people towards the policy. A 1989 IpsosMORI (2013) poll indicated 
privatisation was the third least popular of Thatcher’s policies, beaten only supposed 
NHS underfunding and the Poll Tax. The majority of the British people remain of the 
opinion key public services—including utility companies, public transport, schools, 
the Royal Mail and the NHS—should be in the public sector, not the private sector 
(YouGov, 2017).
5.3 Conclusion: privatisation
It has often been said (e.g. Thatcher, 1992; Lang in Hansard, 1996; The Economist, 
1999) that privatisation is one of Britain’s biggest export success stories: And it cannot 
Fig. 6. Percentage of total market value of UK quoted shares by sector of the beneficial owner.
Source: ONS (2015b, 2017a).
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be denied that, in the short term at least, the nation gained much foreign exchange from 
the sale of many of its productive assets to global capitalists and foreign governments. 
Spending the proceeds arising from the sale of public assets may have been politically 
more acceptable, and more popular, than increasing taxes, (further) borrowing or cut-
ting public expenditure (Brittan, 1984). However, increasing foreign ownership of the 
UK’s productive assets is not compatible with democratic capitalism. Neither is there 
any evidence privatisation led to efficiency gains which benefited the British people.
6. The moral economy
Thatcher (1977, 1980, 1986, 1987, 1993) argued that making the UK great again required, 
not economic policy, but the re-establishing of the moral spirit of the British people. She 
further argued that promoting liberal (free-market) economic values would motivate the 
adoption of conservative moral values (c.f. Cameron, 2012, in a similar vein).
If her policies failed in the major economic dimensions, we might regard her policies 
as a success (by her standards) if she had improved the moral economy of the nation. 
There is no agreed metric against which this might be judged. Following Thatcher, 
we consider the impact of her policies on: living within one’s means, the family, crime 
rates, and philanthropy and community.
6.1 Tax, borrow and spend
Thatcher was convinced that the public share of the economy must be reined 
in. Apparently unaware of the productive nature of much government spending 
(Mazzucato, 2013), the 1979 Conservative manifesto (Conservative Party, 1979) 
stated, where government ‘takes too much of the nation’s income’ and ‘spends and 
borrows too much’, in the long term there is ‘less wealth’. Yet, insofar as she set herself 
the goal of reducing these, she failed; neither taxation, borrowing nor spending de-
clined over the course of her government.
The total value of central government receipts was 30.4% of GDP in 1979; by 1990, 
this proportion had risen to 30.9%. The highest ‘tax’ take of the 1980s, 33.5% of GDP 
in 1982, has only recently been surpassed in 2011 (ONS Online a, Online b). Neither 
did Thatcher’s policies reduce government spending. In real terms, the total managed 
expenditure rose by 7.7% from 1979 to 1990 (ONS Online c, Online d).
The story is, however, rather better with regard to debt, in the short run at least. The 
billions of pounds arising from privatisation and North Sea oil and gas revenues tem-
porarily reduced the public sector borrowing requirement. As a percentage of GDP, 
though not in nominal terms, public sector debt fell from 1979 to 1990 (Figure 7).
Privatisation can deliver, however, only a one-off windfall and once the most prof-
itable assets had been sold, government debt began to increase again. By 1997, when 
the Conservatives left office, public debt was a greater proportion of GDP than it had 
been in 1979. Rather more worrying, what decline there had been in public sector 
debt, was more than offset by increasing household debt as many British house-
holds resorted to credit to make up the shortfall in their incomes (c.f. Crouch, 2008, 
2009). Furthermore, Britons had become more dependent on social security during 
the 1980s. The ratio of overall cash benefits to the original income of the bottom 10% 
of UK households increased from 176% in 1979 to 295% in 1990 (ONS Online e): 
The equivalent figures for the median household were 13% and 17% (ONS Online e).
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6.2 Families
we could only get to the roots of crime and much else besides by concentrating on strengthening the trad-
itional family (Thatcher, 1993, p. 628)
At the core of society, so Thatcher was convinced, were the individual and the (trad-
itional) family unit (Thatcher, 1987) motivated by self-interest. However, according to 
ONS (2017b), the family unit was not obviously strengthened by her policies. Rather, 
divorces increased by 11% between 1979 and 1990; although they subsequently de-
clined by 4% under Major, this might have been simply because there were fewer 
marriages. The marriage rate for men (per 1,000 unmarried men) was 58 in 1979, the 
equivalent rate for women was 47. By 1990, these rates had fallen to 42 and 36, re-
spectively; in 1997, they stood at 32 and 28 (ONS, 2014).
It need hardly be said, the promotion of individual self-interest is hardly likely to 
increase the possibility of romantic attachment (Röpke, 1950, p. 52). Furthermore, as 
inequality increases, there is evidence that the economically vulnerable find it increas-
ingly difficult to form long-term romantic attachments (Gould and Paserman, 2003; 
Carbone and Cahn, 2013; Schneider and Reich, 2014). This implies that the prospect 
of achieving Thatcher’s goal of strengthening the traditional family was undermined by 
the impact of her own policies.
The impact of declining family prospects has fallen on British children. Recently, UNICEF 
(2007) placed the UK at the bottom of a child well-being league table of 21 industrialised 
nations. The UK’s poor showing was attributed, in part, to high levels of inequality, poverty 
and a ‘dog-eat-dog’ society (Bradshaw cited on BBC News, 2007; Dorling, 2018).
6.3 Crime
Whether because of the continued weakening of family bonds, social disconnection 
and stress or for some other reasons, crime rates increased under Thatcher. According 
to the crime survey of England and Wales (ONS, 2017c), the total theft offences per 
10,000 increased by 53% from 1981 to 1991; the rate of all crimes increased by 34% 
(ONS, 2017c). There was a sea-change in homicide in the 1980s, but it was not for the 
Fig. 7. Household and public sector debt (% of GDP).
Source: Cecchetti et al. (2011); and authors’ calculations.
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better. According to Dorling (2006), men leaving school in the summer of 1981 (and 
later generations) had a greater chance of being murdered than did their elder siblings.
Crime rates began to decline under Thatcher’s successor, Major. Although the cause of 
the so-called crime drop—which is, broadly speaking, an international phenomenon—is 
still much debated amongst criminologists (Farrell et al., 2011, 2014), none has ascribed it 
to a renewal of the moral economy. More recently, there is some evidence that the police-
recorded crime rate has begun to increase again, particularly the rate of violent crime—for 
example, the rate of knife crime in London and other major UK cities (ONS Online f).
6.4 Philanthropy and community
Complementing the increase in unemployment and poverty experienced by many in 
the UK of the 1980s was a decline in economic security. Thatcher (1992) was con-
cerned ‘too much security removes a man’s dignity’, and led to ‘dependency culture’ 
(Thatcher, 2003, p. 61). She was further concerned if the state were to eliminate social 
problems, the nation’s moral judgement would atrophy and a typical Briton become ‘a 
moral cripple’ (Thatcher, 1977).
Notwithstanding the opportunities for the British to call on their sense of morality 
and help out their fellows (so long as they did not support their fellows through union-
isation, c.f. Stepney, 2014), the ‘living tapestry’ (Thatcher, 1987) of individuals was 
rather more unravelled than woven in the 1980s. For example, the share of the popu-
lation claiming to be members of one or more voluntary associations fell from 52% in 
1981 to 43% by 1991 (Ferguson, 2013).
Community bonds in general have deteriorated since the 1980s, as Britons' social net-
works decline and fragment, particularly in the inner urban areas (Stepney, 2018b). There 
has also been a long-term decline in the proportion of British households giving to charities, 
which dates from the 1980s (Charities Aid Foundation, 2012). This decline is particularly 
marked amongst the under-30s (Charities Aid Foundation, 2012); that is, those who were 
born after the implementation of, and therefore most influenced by, Thatcher’s policies.
Ironically, the British were prepared to make sacrifices to promote social justice—
through the state. According to NatCen (2017), in 1983, 32% of Britons thought 
government ought to increase taxes and spend more on health, education and social 
benefits; this increased to 54% by 1990 (it was 48% in 2016). Conversely, the propor-
tion of the British who thought government ought to reduce tax and spending declined 
from 9% in 1983 to 3% in 1990 (it was 4% in 2016) (NatCen, 2017).
6.5 Conclusion: the moral economy
Ultimately, Thatcher’s policies failed to build a living tapestry of individuals. Furthermore, 
her policy regime did not facilitate the UK’s living within its means. Under neo-liberalism, 
the typical Briton became more, not less, dependent on debt and benefits. Rather than pro-
moting ethics and family values, ‘liberalism has ruthlessly drawn down a reservoir of both 
material and moral resources that it cannot replenish’ (Deneen, 2018, p. 18).
7. The explicable popularity of Thatcher
she made Britain great again (Cameron, 2013)
If it is indeed the case Thatcher failed to deliver on many of her stated policy goals, we 
might well wonder why she appeared, and seemed to remain, so apparently popular 
with the British people, winning re-election in 1983 and 1987. It may be, however, her 
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successes were rather more due to the disorganisation of the opposition, along with 
luck and politics (Stepney, 2014), than sound economics as we discuss below.
7.1 Retaining Keynes at number 10
Reflecting their early poor record on the economy, support for the Conservatives was 
running at 23% in December 1981, yet by the end of the (1982) Falklands War, their 
support had rebounded to 47%. They were ahead in the polls from then until the 1983 
election (Clarke et al., 1986). However, there are reasons to suppose the popularist 
impact of the Falklands War (which war resulted, at least in part, from the diplomatic 
errors of Thatcher’s government: e.g. Freedman, 1982; Barker cited in Briley, 1997; 
McClure, 2004) had subsided by the time Thatcher went to the country.
Ironically, in 1983, it might have been neither her own policies nor war—bumbled 
into but successfully concluded—which saved Thatcher from electoral defeat, but im-
plicit Keynesianism. According to Sanders et al. (1987), Howe’s expansionary 1982 
budget built on and sustained the Conservative’s new-found (Falklands) war-time 
popularity. Notwithstanding their stated aims of rolling back Keynesian economic pol-
icies, the Conservatives were apparently not opposed to using the revenues gained 
from North Sea oil and gas, and the proceeds of their early privatisation experiments, 
to boost the economy. The total managed expenditure increased by more than 3% in 
real terms in 1983 and 1984 (ONS Online c, Online d), even while price inflation was 
declining; for which latter the Conservative policies took the credit.
7.2 The oil unshock
How much the Conservative’s economic policies contributed to the 1983 reduction in 
price inflation is debatable. To some extent at least, relative price stability resulted from 
the easing of the effects of the second oil shock which began in the late 1970s. On coming 
to power, Thatcher faced a high (in the context of the time) oil price of US$29 per barrel; 
by 1982, this had risen further to $35 per barrel. By 1983, the price had begun to decline, 
reducing inflationary pressures. For the remainder of the 1980s and 1990s, oil prices were 
broadly comparable to their levels in the late 1970s (Figure 8; Statistica Online).
Fig. 8. OPEC crude oil price (left-hand scale) and UK net exports of crude oil and petroleum products.
Source: Statistica (Online); ONS (2013); and authors’ calculations.
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Furthermore, even while the global price of oil was declining (not such a good time, 
one might think, for Britain to be selling its non-renewable fuel stocks), the Thatcher 
government benefited to the tune of £167 billion (in 2017–18 prices) from North Sea 
revenues (Scottish Government, 2012). There was, however, a downside: As the UK 
began to export fossil fuels, Britain being barely even able to afford to buy its own oil 
(Cripps, 1981), the exchange rate appreciated, making it yet more difficult for UK in-
dustry to compete globally.3 This phenomenon, known as the ‘Dutch disease’ (Forsyth 
and Kay, 1980), was recognised at the time. Sir Michael Edwardes of BL Ltd (aka 
British Leyland), for example, argued in 1981 that, if the cabinet of the day did not 
have the wit or imagination to keep oil revenues from hurting the UK economy, it 
should ‘leave the bloody stuff in the ground’ (quoted in NY Times, 1981). Sadly, his 
advice was not followed. In contrast, Norway, which similarly exploited its oil and gas 
reserves, used much of the proceeds to build a sovereign wealth fund for investment 
purposes. This offset the impact of fossil fuel exports on the exchange rate and paid 
for the accumulation of productive public-owned assets for the benefit of current and 
future generations.
7.3 There is no (political) alternative
Notwithstanding Thatcher’s landslide win in 1983, and a comfortable win in 1987, her 
popularity never completely recovered from the policy failures of her first few years. 
The Conservative share of the vote declined with every election she fought.
The Conservatives won 43.9% of the vote in 1979, 42.4% in 1983, and 42.2% 
in 1987 (Audickas et  al., 2017). The increase in the number of seats won by the 
Conservative Party—339, 397 and 376 in 1979, 1983, and 1987, respectively 
(Audickas et al., 2017)—has more to do with the 1981 splitting of the main oppos-
ition political party into the Labour and Social Democratic Parties. The vagaries of 
the UK’s first-past-the-post electoral system are such that smaller parties with support 
distributed throughout the country are effectively excluded from government, albeit 
they draw support away from the main parties. Consider, for example, that in 1983, the 
SDP/Liberal Alliance polled 25.4% of the vote and won 23 seats, while the rump of the 
Labour Party polled barely better at 27.6% of the vote, yet won 209 seats (Audickas 
et al., 2017).4
It seems reasonable to suppose the apparent support for Thatcher which might be 
concluded from a consideration of the numbers of MPs, arose, at least in part, from 
the disorganisation of the opposition(s). This is not to say, of course, that many, albeit 
a declining minority, felt her policies were at least as good if not better than those on 
offer from other parties.
7.4 Popular support for Thatcherism
Despite her failure to deliver economically or socially for the British people in the long 
term, it is clear Thatcher played a bad hand well politically. One-time windfalls from 
North Sea oil and gas, boosted by the proceeds of privatisation and Right to Buy, were 
3 The same thing happens, of course, when UK property or shares are sold overseas, other things 
being equal.
4 Notwithstanding, Thatcher’s share of the vote was greater than that of many recent governments; for ex-
ample, Cameron’s 2015 Conservative government, achieved only 36.8% of the vote (Audickas et al., 2017).
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used to cut tax (for the affluent) and increase government spending. On top of this, 
billions of pounds of (former) public assets were undersold to those British people who 
were fortunate enough to be in a position to take advantage of the opportunity to make 
windfall capital gains.
Furthermore, Thatcher was able to rely on support from the popular media, espe-
cially the Murdoch Empire (Stepney, 2014). In regard to this latter, historian Niall 
Ferguson, one of the self-confessed ‘foot-soldiers in the Thatcher Revolution’, opines:
The generals were the newspaper proprietors – Rupert Murdoch and Conrad Black – and the editors – in 
particular David English of the Daily Mail, but also Andrew Neil of the Sunday Times and Charles 
Moore of the Spectator. (Ferguson, 2013, ch. 2)
7.5 Conclusion: popularity
Ultimately, whether deserved or not, Thatcher’s government was popular—certainly, 
more popular than a divided opposition—and her 1979 government owned a greater 
share of the vote than any UK government has enjoyed since. Many of her policies 
were by their natures one-off, yet few considered how Britain would pay its way in the 
world once North Sea oil and gas began to run out, the most valuable public assets 
were sold, and the proceeds of these windfalls spent.
8. Conclusion
Thatcher claimed that she had improved the economic prospects of the UK and all its 
citizens through the application of neo-liberal policies; that is (according to her defin-
ition of neo-liberalism), free-market policies (Thatcher, 2003). The evidence, however, 
does not support this claim.
Economic growth was weaker under Thatcher than under preceding governments 
and, if subsequent governments performed no better, this is not because they radic-
ally departed from her policy prescriptions (Dorling, 2010). The costs of this lack of 
growth were disproportionally borne by the poor. The impact of this stagnation was 
more generally felt, however: Those British born in the 1980s appear, on average, to be 
less affluent than their older siblings let alone their parents. In fact, they are increas-
ingly likely to be living with their parents.
Data indicate that Thatcher’s housing policies were effective in boosting home own-
ership in the very short run, but have proved ineffective (at best) in the long run. A re-
cent (Conservative) Prime Minister admitted as much in her 2017 conference speech, 
going so far as to promise a ‘new generation of council houses’ to ‘fix our broken 
housing market’ (May, 2017).
Nor were Thatcher’s policies for creating democratic capitalism any more effective in 
the long run. An increasing proportion of the UK’s productive assets and housing stock 
is now in the hands of foreign capitalists, while British households run up increasing 
debt to compensate for stagnant incomes. As a patriot, it is unlikely Thatcher would re-
gard this as a positive outcome of her policies. Neither did her policies foster the moral 
economy for which she hoped; if anything, rather the opposite.
Thatcher was able to generate and capitalise on a narrative of improving prospects. 
However, to the extent that such improvement as there was rested on North Sea oil 
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and gas, and never to be repeatable sales of accumulated public assets, her policies 
could never provide the foundations of UK prosperity in the long run. Irrespective of 
whether or not we find ourselves in sympathy with Thatcher’s stated goals, it is clear 
her policies failed to address—arguably they exacerbated—the UK’s moral and eco-
nomic malaise. In short, she might have ‘laid out her stall’, but she did not achieve it.
Given that many governments around the world continue to apply broadly 
Thatcherite policies, this analysis implies a substantial reassessment of modern global 
political economy is overdue. As Thatcher herself argued:
Those who think they know, but are mistaken, and act upon their mistakes, are the most dangerous people 
to have in charge. (Thatcher, 2003, p. 104)
On this, at least, we can all agree!
Supplementary data
Supplementary data are available at Cambridge Journal of Economics online.
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